


























































































beeches).21	People	often	don’t	even	realize	that	they	have	such	sub-doxastic	information,	since	much	of	it	guides	inference	and	behavior	without	ever	being	coded	as	explicit	conscious	principles.	We	propose	that	the	core	folk	epistemology	identified	by	Machery	et	al.	(2015)	is	also	a	largely	sub-doxastic	information	store,	as	are	many	of	the	information	stores	probed	by	philosophical	thought	experiments,	which	are,	as	Dennett	(2013)	aptly	puts	it,	“intuition	pumps.”		 It	is	useful	that	not	all	information	in	the	brain	is	conscious;	if	it	were	otherwise,	consciousness	would	be	swamped	and	unable	to	support	decision-making.	But	the	downside	of	this	mostly	useful	arrangement	is	that	it’s	difficult	to	make	sub-doxastic	information	conscious	and	explicit.	The	information	humans	have	about	object	statics,	for	example,	enables	us	to	stack	things	(Povinelli	2000,	Baillargeon	2002);	it’s	not	there	to	help	us	verbalize	axioms	of	object	statics.	Your	sub-doxastic	fear	system	(another	example)	may	tell	your	consciousness	that	something	is	a	threat—you	feel	a	fright	at	it—without	revealing	the	information	it	uses	to	categorize	something	as	a	threat.	The	path	from	the	sub-doxastic	storage	up	to	conscious	verbal	formulation	is	rocky.		 We	have,	however,	a	cognitive	tool	for	digging	information	out.	We	can	voluntarily	imagine	situations	and	then	see	whether	our	sub-doxastic	systems	produce	an	error	or	no-error	signal	of	some	sort—or	any	other	reaction.	Sub-doxastic	systems	produce	fast	reactions	to	events	in	the	world.		But	we	can	also	imagine	events	in	order	to	get	similar	kinds	of	reaction.	Since	the	world	to	which	sub-doxastic	systems	react	largely	arrives	in	a	sensory	way,	imaginings,	which	often	have	sensory	constituents	(mental	imagery),	can	help	get	those	reactions.	These	reactions	are	imagination-induced	intuitions.	What	is	imagined	can	be	chosen	voluntarily,	but	the	intuition	the	imagining	induces	is	not	subject	voluntary	control	and	is	often	not	even	anticipated	(that’s	often	the	point):	it’s	spontaneous.	And	the	intuition	is	non-theoretical	in	that,	instead	of	conforming	to	antecedent	conscious	thought,	it	conforms	to	sub-doxastic	information.	Finally,	though	the	intuition	is	conscious,	though	the	sub-doxastic	information	generating	it	is	not.			 Our	goal	is	to	apply	this	framework	to	thought-experimental	intuitions.	But	first,	let’s	again	observe	a	similar	process	in	the	linguistic	case,	just	to	have	a	parallel	example.		Suppose	we	consciously	endorsed	a	grammatical	rule	that	a	grade	school	teacher	might	have	taught	us:	“nouns	are	pluralized	whenever	they	refer	to	numerically	more	than	one	object,	but	not	otherwise.”	But	now	imagine	the	following	(ungrammatical)	strings	of	words:		 *He	ate	zero	piece	of	cake.	*On	her	plate	was	0.5	piece	of	cake.	*They	shared	1.0	piece	of	cake.			
																																																								21	This	is	a	cross-culturally	shared	“axiom”	of	folk	biology	(Atran	et	al.	1997).	We	put	“know”	here	in	scare	quotes	to	refer	to	implicit	awareness	of	information	that	helps	guide	behavior,	even	if	that	awareness	doesn’t	rise	to	the	level	of	knowledge	in	a	strict	sense.	
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	Gendler	(1998:	415)	interprets	this	passage	as	saying	that	much	of	the	valuable	and	reliable	information	we	have	is	in	our	minds	“not	organized	under	any	theoretical	framework.”	We	endorse	Gendler’s	interpretation	and	note	that	it	fits	well	with	the	aims	of	this	paper.	Intuitions	issue	from	the	non-theoretical	“treasure-store”	of	sub-doxastic	information,	when	that	store	is	prompted	by	imaginings,	including	thought	experiments.		 In	sum,	intuitions	are	spontaneous,	conscious	products	of	sub-doxastic,	non-theoretical	systems,	which	can	be	elicited	by	way	of	imagining.	This	appears	to	be	so	for	intuitions	in	response	to	many	sorts	of	imagined	situation,	including	especially	those	portrayed	in	philosophical	thought	experiments.	How	does	the	conscious	interpretation	of	intuitions	work?		 There	is	no	single	answer	to	this	question,	since	interpretation	is	holistic.	But	let’s	sketch	how	it	goes	sometimes.	When	one	has	an	intuition,	one	forms	a	belief	that	one	had	an	experience	with	a	certain	phenomenology.	Call	this	the	experience	belief.	One	then	forms	linking	beliefs	that	link	the	experience	belief,	which	is	about	the	intuition,	to	the	body	of	theoretical	beliefs	under	consideration.	A	linking	belief	could	be:	“If	theoretical	propositions	p1,	.	.	.	,	pn	were	true,	then	the	thought	experimental	case	wouldn’t	have	prompted	the	negative	intuition	it	did.”	This	linking	belief,	in	conjunction	with	the	experience	belief,	prompts	one	to	reject	at	least	one	of	the	theoretical	propositions	p1,	.	.	.	,	pn.	But	which	one?	Here	one	must	use	other	beliefs	to	help	figure	out	which	of	p1,	.	.	.	,	pn		is	most	worth	rejecting.	One	might	then	judge	that	p3	is	false.	If	one	does,	one	might	carelessly	say,	“I	have	an	intuition	that	p3	is	false.”	But	this	talk,	though	tempting,	conflates	the	intuition	with	the	follow-on	judgment.	We	should	not	attribute	p3	to	the	intuition	because	(i)	the	denial	of	p3	is	a	theoretical	belief	that	has	its	significance	partly	in	virtue	of	other	surrounding	theoretical	beliefs	and	(ii)	one	may	just	as	well	have	come	to	reject	p2	or	p4	instead	of	p3	in	light	of	the	intuition	and	experience	belief,	if	one	had	had	somewhat	different	background	beliefs.24	So	linking	the	intuition	specifically	to	denial	that	p3	is	true,	even	if	that’s	the	judgment	one	comes	to	have,	is	a	mistake.			 This	concludes	our	positive	theory	of	interpreting	intuitions,	which,	once	grasped,	is	fairly	simple.	For	convenience,	we	restate	its	basic	components	here:		 1. Thought	experiments	are	represented	in	conscious	imaginative	acts.	2. Those	imaginative	acts	trigger	further	processing	in	sub-doxastic	systems.	3. As	a	result	of	that	processing,	which	is	unconscious,	the	sub-doxastic	systems	bring	about	an	intuition	in	consciousness.	4. That	intuition	is	non-propositional,	though	it	often	has	a	positive	or	negative	valence.	5. Conscious	thought	interprets	the	intuition	in	light	of	other	beliefs	in	a	way	that	yields	a	propositional	judgment.25																																																									24	Here	the	spectre	of	the	Quine-Duhem	problem	hovers	over	the	interpretation	of	thought-experimental	intuitions.	25	Points	4.	and	5.	here	correspond	to	the	two	“stages”	of	intuition	and	judgment	mentioned	in	the	introduction.	
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	We	think	this	account	covers	a	wide	range	of	thought-experimental	intuitions,	though	perhaps	not	all.	It	is	an	empirical	question	in	the	end	how	far	the	account	extends.	Interpretationalism	has	the	virtue	of	comporting	well	with	both	phenomenology	and	psychology,	and	it	preserves	most	of	what	we	want	to	say	about	the	psychology	of	intuitions:	they	are	spontaneous,	conscious,	and	non-theoretical.	Our	only	major	revision	to	the	psychological	picture	of	intuitions	is	in	giving	up	propositionality.				
5	Conclusion:	The	Use	of	Intuition	in	Philosophy	
	 	We	have	given	reasons	for	thinking	that	many	thought-experimental	intuitions,	including	especially	the	ever-fascinating	Gettier	intuition,	do	not	have	consciously-accessible	propositional	contents.	Mainstream	Propositionalism	is	false.	The	phenomenology	of	having	intuitions	in	response	to	important	thought	experiments	does	not	comport	with	that	view.	The	view	also	stumbles	at	addressing	the	puzzle	of	why	people	with	the	same	intuition	type	say	strikingly	different	things	in	expressing	their	intuition	tokens.	And	the	psychology	of	related	intuitions	about	fictional	sentences	appears	not	to	be	propositional	either.		A	better	view	is	on	offer:	Interpretationalism.	This	view	avoids	the	problems	of	Mainstream	Propositionalism	and	sits	well	with	contemporary	cognitive	science.	On	this	view,	thought-experimental	intuitions	are	conscious	states	that	occur	in	relation	to	imagined	examples	and	philosophical	positions	that	pertain	to	those	examples;	such	intuitions	are	non-propositional,	so	their	philosophical	significance	in	propositional	terms	needs	to	be	worked	out	through	a	process	of	interpretation	in	conjunction	with	background	beliefs.	One	cannot	simply	“read	off”	propositional	content	from	a	thought-experimental	intuition.	The	appearance	to	the	contrary	is	largely	the	product	(i)	of	confusing	the	intuition	with	follow-on	propositional	judgments	(which	may	occur	in	quick	succession)26	and	(ii)	of	wishful	thinking.		 What	wishful	thinking	do	we	mean?	Doing	philosophy	would	be	a	neater,	more	straightforward	process	if	our	thought-experimental	intuitions	had	clear,	conscious	propositional	contents.	Propositions	would	be	convenient	places	to	begin	theorizing,	even	if	we	treated	them	as	defeasible.	Propositions,	on	many	construals,	are	structured	in	a	way	that	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	logical	derivation,	a	process	at	which	most	philosophers	have	some	skill.	We	thus	suspect,	though	few	would	openly	endorse	it,	that	many	philosophers	are	still	quietly	tempted	by	the	lull	of	an	image	of	philosophy	in	which	intuited	propositions	plus	logical	inference	forms	straightforwardly	justify	philosophical	theories.	But	that’s	just	not	how	it	works.	Rather,	intuitions	cast	shade	or	sunlight	over	certain	regions	of	intellectual	space,																																																									26	One	more	point	on	terminology:	even	if	Mainstream	Propositionalists	wanted	to	stipulate	that	they	use	the	word	“intuition”	to	refer	to	judgments,	they	would	still	need	a	word	for	the	things	we	call	intuition,	which	are	non-propositional	and	no	doubt	exist;	also,	they	would	have	to	give	up	the	non-theoreticality	of	intuition,	which	is	supposed	to	be	its	chief	epistemic	virtue,	since	the	judgments	that	issue	from	thought	experiments	are	theoretically	loaded.		
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inviting	us	to	look	further.	The	resulting	philosophical	work	we	must	do	is	far	more	difficult	than	the	Mainstream	Propositionalist	picture	would	have	us	think.	But	it	is	also,	in	the	end,	much	more	creative	and	rewarding.			
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